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Development economics and radical theories of the peripheral state

by

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'The obvious puzzle presented by these proposals (contained in the ILO *Report on Employment, Incomes and Equality in Kenya*) is what incentive the mission thought all these groups - the heart and soul of the comprador alliance - might possibly have for making such sacrifices ... What ... would induce the government to do in the 1970s what it had not only not done, but had destroyed its opponents for advocating, in the 1960s?'

- Colin Leys¹

Leys's criticism of the ILO report on Kenya could be made *mutatis mutandis*, in connection with countless pieces of policy advice given by development economists all over the 'Third World'. Conventional development economics is vulnerable at the level of policy recommendation because it does not have an adequate theory of the state. In fact many economists work virtually without a theory of the state as a result of a well-entrenched professional attitude about 'politics' based on a faulty chain of reasoning. We may rely on Lipsey, author of a widely-used elementary economics text-book to introduce us to the first defective link in the chain. 'The ability to separate positive inquiries from normative ones', asserts Lipsey breezily, 'has been one of the main reasons for the success of science in the last 300 years ... Positive statements concern what *is*, *was* or *will be* ... Normative statements concern what ought to be.'² Lipsey himself realises that the distinction won't stand up to criticism in the end, for in the footnotes to the very next page we read 'Philosopher friends have persuaded me that, when pushed to its limits, the distinction between positive and normative becomes blurred, or else breaks down completely.' That doesn't stop him and many others, however, from making 'positive economics' their area of professional concern. Of course, when it comes to policy design, such economists need a 'value input' which they regard it as the politician's job to supply. An apocryphal story has the head of a team of development economists saying to an African president: 'Specify your social welfare function and we'll devise a plan for optimising it.' An absurd story, of course, but a little consideration of *why* it is absurd will perhaps be instructive.

We could take a fairly cynical view of the situation and observe that if the president is dedicated to the enrichment of a small dominant class by all possible means and with no regard for the welfare of anyone else, he is scarcely likely to say so. It is always good policy to be publicly committed to goodness and truth and beauty and if contemporary taste requires it, let us have development

plans based on these 'value inputs.' Everyone who 'knows the score' will, of course, make ritual obeisance to such plans, perhaps stressing the attractive bits (e.g. the desirability of wage restraint among the poor) and then attend to their real interests. In all this, development economists are in a similar position to European poets and painters in earlier centuries. In order to live they had to seek a rich patron (no matter how dissolute or pox-ridden) to whom they could address themselves as 'your obedient servants.' Under such circumstances one finds oneself *driven* to *maiveté* .

It was the achievement of the good soldier Svejek not to allow himself to become confused by the subterfuges he was obliged to adopt in order to survive. Many of us do not reach his level of clarity, preferring to explain to ourselves in an ethically murky situation that we are capable of being better, truer and more beautiful than the situation really allows. So it is that we become involved in ideology (an ideological belief may be defined simply, for our purposes, as one which is adhered to on grounds other than its truth, the other grounds often being material interest), an involvement it is the function of criticism to combat. And since one of the few generalisations one can safely make about the 'peripheral state' is that one can expect to find considerable ethical murkiness within it, it is as well to be on one's critical guard against ideology when thinking about it.

Perhaps we may exercise our critical faculties a little on the closest thing to a theory of the developing state that conventional development economics has produced, namely, 'modernisation theory'. It is beyond the scope of this paper to attempt a comprehensive critique of modernisation theory; instead I propose to consider a single fairly recent and influential work in the field - Adelman and Morris's *Society, Politics and Economic Development*.³ This study considered (initially) all non-European countries (European countries were excluded on the grounds of being 'developed' and therefore of no interest) that 'as of 1950 or thereafter, were in receipt of intergovernmental aid from the United States'.⁴ A few such countries were dropped from consideration, information on them being too limited. More seriously, 'the major exclusion, and the one most likely to introduce a bias in our results, was that of the less-developed communist countries. The reason for excluding these countries was the overwhelming lack of comparable data, particularly with regard to various aspects of economic structure.'⁵

Adelman and Morris proceed by assigning values to a considerable number of social, political and economic indicators. They then apply modern techniques of multi-variate analysis to uncover underlying structures in the data. Of greatest interest to us is their set of political indicators, listed below:

- degree of national integration and sense of national unity
- degree of centralisation of political power
- strength of democratic institutions
- degree of freedom of political opposition and press
- degree of competitiveness of political parties
- predominant basis of the political party system
- strength of the labour movement
- political strength of the traditional elite
- political strength of the military
- degree of administrative efficiency
- extent of leadership commitment to economic development
- extent of political stability ⁶

By and large one rates as 'modern' if one is roughly in the same position as the United States (or more accurately, the same position that the theorists of what C. Wright Mills called 'The Great American Celebration' ascribed to the United States). For example, one gets an A for degree of administrative efficiency if one's 'public administration was reasonably efficient. These countries had relatively well-trained civil services and did not suffer from instability of policy at higher administrative levels. Corruption was not widespread. Finally, bureaucratic inefficiency was not as marked as in most less-developed countries.' 'Countries in which public administration was characterised by extreme bureaucratic inefficiency and/or widespread corruption and/or serious instability of policy at higher administrative levels' ⁷ were awarded a C and those in which all three of these phenomena prevailed were classified C-. The interested reader, as they say in mathematics textbooks, may verify that a similar result holds in other cases. This exposes Adelman and Morris to the charge of 'American ethnocentrism', which, it has been argued is a feature of all modernisation theory. The result of this ethnocentrism is neatly summarised by Hoogvelt:

'... The continuing influence of this theorising upon development *policies* can hardly be exaggerated. The key to this 'influence lies in the confusion of the methodological construct of 'structural compatibility' with that of 'causes' of social change. Because modernisation theories have viewed the total

transformation, that is westernisation of developing countries to be an inescapable outcome of successful diffusion of the Western economic/technological complex, by methodological *reversal* it is argued that a reorganisation of existing social and cultural as well as political patterns in anticipation of their compatibility with the diffused Western economic/technological complex may in fact *facilitate* the very process of this diffusion itself. This monumental theoretical error - which to be fair was not always committed by the theorists themselves - has in fact been made and continues to be made by modernisation policy-makers such as those employed by Western governments, U.N. organisations, the World Bank, and so forth.' ⁸

Despite the problems of sample bias and ethnocentrism, it might be instructive to look at Adelman and Morris's results on the political front. Methodologies which are less than perfect may sometimes yield interesting results (we might refer to this as the first principle of 'methodological opportunism'). Taking all countries together, Adelman and Morris were able to derive an association 'between per capita GNP and two aspects of sociopolitical change: the socio-cultural concomitants of the industrialisation-urbanisation process and the evolution of participant political institutions.' ⁹ In their explanation of this finding, Adelman and Morris's ethnocentricity finds perhaps its clearest expression: 'The association between more democratic and better articulated and integrated political systems, on the one hand, and levels of economic development, on the other, probably arises because both the ability to generate sustained economic growth and the evolution of more sophisticated political institutions require fundamental changes in mentality characteristic of the spread of rational thought patterns. The participant style of life tends to generate a capacity to adapt existing institutional frameworks to continual economic and social change. This malleability of social structure is essential both to successful entrepreneurial activity and to effective political modernisation.' ¹⁰ In the light of acknowledged sample bias, this is indeed an incautious conclusion; interestingly, there is a disjunction between it and other conclusions drawn. Adelman and Morris divide up their sample into countries at low, intermediate and high levels of development. For countries at a low level of development they conclude that 'political forces do not exert a particularly strong systematic effect on rates of economic growth, *even though there is a slight tendency for authoritarian governments to be more effective economically.*' ¹¹ (my italics). And for countries at intermediate levels, they find 'politically, the government of a typical nation at this level still does not play an especially effective role in stimulating economic

modernisation. Furthermore, while the mild, positive association that we found for countries at the lowest level, between more autocratic forms of government and more rapid economic growth, still persists at this level, neither the precise form of the political system nor the leadership's attitude toward development appears to be an important systematic determinant of economic performance for these countries.' ¹²

Adelman and Morris end up then, with what might be called a 'null result' even at the level of 'structural compatibility' and if, as I believe to be the case, their approach is typical of modernisation theory, then we see that modernisation theory does not get us very far. This is the probable reason for the recent drying up of work of this kind. The expanding field at present seems to be that of the study of the 'peripheral state' and it is to a study of some of this literature that the rest of this paper is devoted.

Radical theories of peripheral societies start out (though to varying degree) from Marxian premises. As Foster-Carter points out, however, Marxists are divided over the fundamental issue of the proper characterisation of 'under-development' itself. ¹³ We may cull brief descriptions of the major contenders from the pages of Foster-Carter's article:

(i) 'Warren, for instance, argues that the 'Third World' today is at an early stage (or various stages) of industrialisation and the development of capitalism, precisely as we know these processes from the experience of 'developed' countries' ¹⁴

(ii) Then 'there is the conception of underdevelopment as a transition blocked, a ('normal') process incomplete. This I take to be the sense of Kay's dictum that 'capital created underdevelopment not because it exploited the under-developed world, but because it did not exploit it enough' - a fact which he attributes to the unduly prolonged dominance in the Third World of merchant capital, unable as it is to revolutionise the mode of production' ¹⁵

(iii) For Amin, 'the 'blocked transition' becomes 'peripheral capitalism' - a reality *sui generis*. The 'normal' development of capitalism (as studied, and formally stated, by Marx in *Capital*) is but one variant ... This is 'autocentric', based on a dynamic relationship between producer goods and

consumer goods sectors and fuelled by home market demand. The Third World, by contrast, has from the beginning been extraverted, externally oriented: here the key sectors are export production and import consumption, again dynamically related but perversely so, and with no prospect of debouching into the 'autocentric' type.' ¹⁶

(iv) For Frank, 'capitalism is constituted by a uniform hierarchy of metropolis and satellite, expropriating and appropriating surplus upwards and outwards, nationally and internationally. In particular ... Frank will have none of any suggestion that the penetration of capitalism is in some sense partial or incomplete, so that underdevelopment should be understood as a form of combination of capitalism with something else.' ¹⁷

(v) 'Against Frank's ubiquitous and homogeneous 'capitalism', Laclau posits *not* a dualistic model (he too speaks of an 'indissoluble unity') but a structured and differentiated whole, the 'economic system' - others will call it 'social formation' - which is indeed capitalistic ... Laclau ... maintains that there were and are substantial elements of feudalism in Latin America. Yet - and here is the twist - these exist not exogenous to capitalism, nor as pockets of decline, but as an intrinsic and structured part of a wider system. In Latin America ... it was precisely the impact of an external market which - so far from dissolving - intensified or even invented feudal and other precapitalist modes of production. We thus have the paradox of capitalism's relation to other modes of production being conceived not (or not simply) as *succession* or *evolution* (as in the 'stages' model) ... nor yet as some kind of dialectical *transcendence* and *dissolution* ... nor even as a *transition*. On the contrary, this capitalism neither evolves mechanically from what precedes it, nor does it necessarily dissolve it.' ¹⁸ This is the view that has most commended itself to radical scholars working on South African history.

(vi) Finally, it is worth mentioning the old Comintern line that, as capitalism expanded in colonised countries, one could expect a conflict to develop between national and metropolitan bourgeoisies, the former leading the bourgeois-democratic revolution against imperialism. ¹⁹ Of all the Marxist positions, this is now the least plausible and is explicitly countered by Sunkel's model of 'trans-national integration.' As summarised by Langdon 'such a model involves a much more comprehensive and symbiotic alliance between the emerging indigenous bourgeois and foreign capital. The former is incorporated more fully into the international capitalist economy, at the expense of non-integrated majorities in the periphery

economies. Given this transnationalisation view, neither independent capitalist development nor promising class contradictions can be expected from relations between foreign and domestic capital.' ²⁰

Again, it is beyond the scope of this study to provide more comprehensive accounts of these positions, to identify what is at stake between them or to argue for one position against the others. The latter tasks would require both theoretical development and criticism and an evaluation of the fruitfulness of the various approaches when applied to the study of concrete situations. What needs to be observed here is that different characterisations of peripheral economies will have different implications for the way in which we think about the peripheral state.

An influential article on the state in post-colonial societies has been that of Alavi on Pakistan and Bangladesh. ²¹ In it he advanced two controversial theses about the post-colonial state, namely that it is firstly 'overdeveloped' and secondly 'relatively autonomous.' These two theses are connected - let us take a look at Alavi's formulations and then the criticisms directed against them:

(i) the overdeveloped state: The task of the metropolitan bourgeoisie 'in the colony is not merely to replicate the superstructure of the state which it had established in the metropolitan country itself. Additionally, it has to create state apparatus through which it can exercise dominion over *all* the indigenous social classes in the colony. It might be said that the 'super-structure' in the colony is therefore 'over-developed' in relation to the 'structure' in the colony ... The post-colonial society inherits that over-developed apparatus of state and its institutionalised practices through which the operations of indigenous social classes are regulated and controlled.' ²²

(ii) relative autonomy: Alavi takes the interests of 'three propertied exploiting classes' to be dominant in postcolonial societies, namely 'the indigenous bourgeoisie, the metropolitan neo-colonialist bourgeoisies and the landed classes.' ²³ However Alavi argues that these three classes 'do not constitute a 'whole', for they have different structural bases and competing class interests.' ²⁴ Hence the classical position (as summed up by Poulantzas) of Marxism on the relative autonomy of the state does not apply to the post-colonial state in Alavi's opinion. The quotation from Poulantzas is worth

reproducing: 'When Marx designated Bonapartism as the 'religion of the bourgeoisie,' in other words a characteristic of all forms of the capitalistic State, he showed that this State can only truly serve the ruling class in so far as it is relatively autonomous from the diverse fractions of this class, precisely in order to organise the hegemony of the whole of this class.' ²⁵ Yet Alavi himself states that in the post-colonial state the mutual interests of the three dominant classes 'are no longer antagonistic and contradictory; rather they are mutually competing but reconciliable' ²⁶ and it appears to his critics that his distinction between 'classical' and 'post-colonial' relative autonomy is built on foundations of sand. ²⁷ For, in general, it is the function of the state to hold the ring for competing dominant classes to adjust their interests. This is a view which looks similar to conventional 'pluralist' theories of the democratic state; however, Marxists would observe with Schattschneider that 'the flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly choir sings with a strongly upper-class accent' ²⁸ and would further identify the upper class with the owners of the means of production. To make this general observation is not, of course, to deny that the peripheral state may operate in a different fashion from the metropolitan state. Indeed, we would expect it to do so if the class configurations differed between them. Hence Leys's dictum: 'In order to understand the significance of any state for the class struggle we must start out from the class struggle, not the state.' ²⁹

It is at the level of class analysis that the greatest weakness appears in the contemporary Marxist literature. This has taken the form of an inconclusive debate of the role of the petit bourgeois (and especially the state bureaucracy) in the peripheral state. This is symptomatic of a deeper malaise in the light of a well-established Marxist tendency to use the classification 'petit bourgeois' as a default option; if you don't know where else to put someone, you put him there. This problem is most clearly seen by Leys who points out that 'Briefly, Marx's use of the term 'petty-bourgeoisie' was historically fairly specific. It referred to small manufacturers, shopkeepers, peasants and artisans ... It was a 'petit' bourgeois class in the sense of being in possession of small amounts of capital, and hence having an interest in the preservation of private property, and hence having an interest in the preservation of the power of the bourgeoisie proper. On the other hand, its interests were also opposed to those of the bourgeoisie; individual members of this class, however, are

being constantly 'hurled down into proletariat by the action of competition, and, as modern industry develops, they even see the moment approaching when they will completely disappear as an independent section of modern society' ... The political consciousness of the petty bourgeois reflected this ambivalence ... of a transitional class ... By contrast the word 'petty bourgeois' as used by the parties to the debate on the state bureaucracy in post-colonial Africa refers mainly to (i) owners of small amounts of non-agricultural capital, such as small manufacturers, contractors, traders etc. (ii) the richer peasants (iii) white collar workers generally ... The 'petty-bourgeoisie' so defined is thus a different concept from that of Marx ... In order to know the real significance of any statement about the 'petty bourgeoisie' as they use it, we need a general analysis of the development of the capitalist mode of production and its relations with petty commodity production, and thus of the development of the relations of production and the class struggle.' ³⁰ Leys's account of the matter is not without its contentious points, however; it was part of Bernstein's 'revisionism' in the context of German Social Democracy at the turn of the century to assert that the petit bourgeoisie was growing rather than declining and that Social Democracy would have to appeal to parts of it - in other words, European Marxism has had its problems about the approach to the petit bourgeois as well. And although Leys asserts that 'whereas Marx's petty bourgeoisie played an ambivalent political role corresponding to its contradictory class interests vis-a-vis the developing bourgeoisie and proletariat, this seems less likely to be true of the 'petty bourgeoisie' as the term is used by both Murray and Shivji,' ³¹ confirmation of this assertion must await the general analysis which he proposes. Von Freyhold conjures up a more fragmented class configuration, for instance: 'Because of the structural heterogeneity of post-colonial societies and the contradictory position of most of its non-proletarian classes the post-colonial governing class has a much wider range of classes and fractions of classes to recruit its supporters from and the policies and actions of the governing class may vacillate according to the chosen combinations.' ³² In the end nothing will substitute for the 'comparative and critical studies' Alavi maintains as being 'needed before we can hope to arrive at a general theory of the state in post-colonial societies.' ³³

All this has led on from a consideration of Alavi's 'relative autonomy' thesis; let us now consider the criticisms of his 'overdeveloped state' thesis. Ziemann

and Lanzendorfer point out the impossibility of specifying a 'normal relation' of state to society, against which post-colonial states can be judged to be 'overdeveloped' ³⁴ and Leys points out 'the state is equally *important* in all class societies; it is no more 'central' in Tanzania than in Britain or the USA (or the USSR).' ³⁵ A more helpful approach is suggested by Langdon, who observes: 'Certainly the state has a critical *general* function in all class societies - the maintaining of cohesion and domination; but it would appear to have a rather particular *further* function in periphery economies, that of managing the meshing of capitalist and pre-capitalist modes of production. And that further function makes the colonial and post-colonial state more central in the direct process of surplus appropriation and capital accumulation than in advanced capitalist economies.' ³⁶

This point may be illustrated by considering a South African example. Bell has given a graphical account of Wolpe's hypothesis about the level of wage rates in the modern sector of the South African economy. ³⁷ His diagram forms the basis of Figure 1. The model, which we shall call the 'Wolpe' model (rather than the Wolpe model, so as to avoid the question of whether Wolpe himself intended it to develop this way) is 'based on the appealingly simple idea that rural income and wage income together must be sufficient to provide subsistence, and that the higher is the contribution of the reserves, the smaller need be the wage rate.' ³⁸ There is also an 'inverse relationship between average reserve income and the aggregate supply of labour available for wage employment. The latter follows from the fact that individuals, according to this model, do not migrate unless rural income falls below subsistence. With a variation in income between individual households, it follows that the lower the average rural income the larger will be the number of individuals whose agricultural income lies below the subsistence level, and hence the greater will be the supply of wage labour. These two inverse relationships clearly give a positive relationship between the wage rate and the supply of labour' ³⁹ as shown in the diagram.




Figure 1 - The 'Wolpe' model

SS' denotes the derived supply curve. Bell regards this model as unsatisfactory in part because 'we are not told anything about the nature of the forces which come into operation to raise the wage rate in response to a decline in reserve productivity' ³⁹ and expresses a preference for conventional theory. However, the 'Wolpe' model, unlike conventional theory, is capable of explaining structural unemployment. To see this, draw in a curve DD' representing the demand for labour in the wage labour sector. Suppose at an average agricultural income a' with corresponding wage rate w' the same amount of labour is demanded and

supplied, as shown. Now suppose average agricultural income drops to a" with the demand for wage labour remaining constant. At the corresponding wage rate w ", a supply of labour $O"S$ " is available, but only $O"D$ " is demanded; unemployment has therefore emerged. And the point is that there is *no* mechanism for its elimination, which justifies us in calling the unemployment structural. Now we know that capitalism made a series of interventions in subsistence agriculture whose effect by the early twentieth century was to drive down average incomes there. Tentatively, I would say that the critical point a' was reached somewhere between 1904 (when the mines' Chinese labour policy testified to a shortage of labour in the wage labour sector) and 1922 (when the Stallard commission reported on the desirability of controlling the presence of Africans in the cities, suggesting that more were presenting themselves than could be absorbed into employment). Between these two dates, of course, there is the 1913 Land Act with its effect of limiting land available for African agriculture and therefore of depressing average agricultural incomes. The emergence of structural unemployment as a result of defective articulation (in the sense of 'fitting together') of the 'subsistence' and capitalist modes of production called forth state policies to manage the 'meshing of capitalist and precapitalist modes of production' - the policies taking the form of the elaboration over time of the modern form of influx control.

Finally it is worth illustrating the point made that different characteristics of peripheral economies will have different implications for the way in which we think about the peripheral state. This may be done by considering possible accounts of the way in which the metropolitan bourgeoisie exercises its dominance over the peripheral economy. A list of suggested explanations may be arranged under two heads:

(i) power exercised through metropolitan state-peripheral state relationships:

(a) 'The government of the post-colonial society (is) sufficiently open to admit the successful intrusion of neo-colonialist interests in the formulation of public policy. Great emphasis is therefore placed by western ideologues on the importance of the bureaucracy as an 'agent of modernisation'. Every effort is made to influence the bureaucracy ideologically in favour of policies which are in conformity with metropolitan interests. This ideology is expressed in the form of 'techniques of planning' and it is presented as an objective science of economic development.' 40

(b) 'International agencies and aid administering agencies who vet viability of projects, advise on development planning and channelize policies of post-colonial governments along lines which suit the metropolitan countries. Influence on state policy through foreign aid as well as private corruption of bureaucrats makes this possible, even when some of the policies are blatantly against the interest of the country.' ⁴¹

(ii) power exercised through multinational corporation - peripheral state relationships

(a) 'As the erstwhile 'national' bourgeoisie grows in size and aspires to extend its interests and move from industries which involve relatively unsophisticated technology, such as textiles, to those which involve the use of highly sophisticated technology such as petro-chemicals and fertilisers, etc., they find that they do not have access to the requisite advanced industrial technology. ... For (this) ... they have to turn for collaboration therefore, to the bourgeoisies of the developed metropolitan countries, or to socialist states. This they do despite the fact that the terms on which the collaboration is offered are such that it hamstrings their own independent future development.' ⁴²

(b) 'In the structurally heterogeneous and disintegrated economies of the periphery, foreign capital rarely owes its profits to ordinary market mechanisms but usually to a monopoly situation which is guaranteed through state action granting preferential tariffs, licences and finance, regulating the prices of inputs or outputs, providing infrastructure, transport facilities and a cheap labour force. Although it is normal in the age of monopoly capitalism for capitalists everywhere to call for the support of the state, the services demanded from post-colonial states require a much more particularistic interference into the economy than is customary in the metropolis.' ⁴³

Whether these explanations are plausible and what weight might be ascribed to each will again depend on analyses of particular cases. Two general points, however, are worth making. Firstly, we may note with Langdon that Warren's account is undercut in the cases where 'it is not an *independent* bourgeoisie emerging ... and itself manipulating the state apparatus; rather the state's symbiosis with the MNC sector gives it institutional independence vis-a-vis that emerging local bourgeoisie, while at the same time bourgeoisie remains

heavily dependent on the state for its surplus appropriation'.⁴⁴ Secondly, it would appear from the candidate accounts just supplied that all of them would best be inserted into a theory of peripheral societies with a strongly developed 'transnational' emphasis.

To what conclusion may this discussion be brought? Not, alas, to a neat summary of rules for thinking about the 'developing' or 'peripheral' state. If modernisation theory has ended up in a cul-de-sac, the road ahead in the form of a theoretical synthesis in the field of Marxist development theory is still to be charted. I hope I have said sufficient in this paper to indicate that such charting will be worth consideration. Indeed development economists would be well advised to attend to this project if they hope to improve on the ILO Kenya mission's performance in the field of policy analysis.

Notes

- 1 in 'Interpreting African underdevelopment: reflections on the ILO Report on Employment, Incomes and Equality in Kenya, *African Affairs* vol. 52, 1973, p. 422.
- 2 in *An Introduction to Positive Economics*, Fourth Edition, Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1975, p.4.
- 3 Subtitled 'A Quantitative Approach', this was first published by John Hopkins Press, Baltimore in 1967.
- 4 Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p.9.
- 5 Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p.10.
- 6 see Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 51-84.
- 7 Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-78.
- 8 A. Hoogvelt, *The Sociology of Developing Societies*, MacMillan, London, 1976, pp. 60-61.
- 9 Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p.171.
- 10 Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p.172.
- 11 Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p.202.
- 12 Adelman and Morris, *op. cit.*, p.230.
- 13 A. Foster-Carter, 'The Modes of Production of Controversy', *New Left Review* 107, Jan/Feb. 1978, p.47.
- 14 Foster-Carter, *op. cit.*, pp.47-48.
- 15 Foster-Carter, *op. cit.*, p.48.
- 16 Foster-Carter, *loc. cit.*
- 17 Foster-Carter, *op. cit.*, p.49.
- 18 Foster-Carter, *op. cit.*, pp.50-51.
- 19 For an account of the Comintern and the colonial question see Chapter XVII F. Barkenau, *World Communism*, Ann Arbor, 1972.
- 20 S. Langdon, 'The State and Capitalism in Kenya' *Review of African Political Economy*, 8, 1977, p.93.
- 21 H. Alavi, 'The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh', *New Left Review*, 74, July/Aug 1972, pp. 59-81.

- 22 Alavi, *op. cit.*, p.61.
- 23 Alavi, *op. cit.*, p.59.
- 24 Alavi, *op. cit.*, p.72.
- 25 N. Poulantzas, 'Capitalism and the State', *New Left Review*, 58, Nov/Dec 1969, p.74. There are problems with Poulantzas's views which are criticised explicitly and implicitly in Chapter IV of R. Miliband, *Marxism and Politics*, Oxford University Press, 1977. One excerpt is worth quoting here: 'In a letter to Marx on 13 April 1866, Engels wrote that 'Bonapartism is after all the real religion of the modern bourgeoisie'. But this was not the case when he wrote these words, nor did it become the case later: the authoritarian option is not 'the religion' of the bourgeoisie: it is its last resort (assuming it is an available resort, which is itself a large and interesting question) when constitutional rule and a limited form of state appear to be inadequate to meet the challenge from below and to ensure the continuance of the existing system of domination.' (Miliband, *op. cit.*, pp. 89-90). Miliband's book is easily the best work on the subject to have appeared in recent years; it testifies to a more keenly critical intellect and a greater sense of style than do its competitors.
- 26 Alavi, *op. cit.*, p. 72.
- 27 This is most explicitly stated in W. Ziemann and M. Lanzendörfer, 'The State in Peripheral Societies', *Socialist Register* 1977, pp.148-49. 'But what appears in Alavi's presentation to be a special feature is actually an integral part of the 'classical' Marxist view of the state, namely its relative autonomy vis.a.vis fractions of capital and the relatively autonomous economic role of the state.'
- 28 E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People*, New York, 1960,
- 29 C. Leys, 'The 'overdeveloped post-colonial state: a re-evaluation', *Review of African Political Economy*, 5, 1976, p.43.
- 30 Leys, *op. cit.*, pp.45-46.
- 31 Leys, *op. cit.*, p.46. The work referred to is R. Murray 'Second Thoughts on Ghana', *New Left Review*, 42, Mar./Apr. 1967 and I. Shivji's, 'Peasants and Class Alliances', *Review of African Political Economy*, 3, 1975.
- 32 M. von Freyhold, 'The Post-Colonial State and its Tanzanian Version', *Review of African Political Economy*, 8, 1977, p.77.
- 33 Alavi, *op. cit.*, p.60.
- 34 Ziemann and Lanzendörfer, *op. cit.*, p.145.
- 35 Leys, *op. cit.*, p.43.

- 36 Langdon, *op. cit.*, p.92.
- 37 in R.T. Bell, 'Surplus Labour and South African Development', Workshop on Unemployment and Labour Reallocation, Pietermaritzburg, March 1977, pp.2-4.
- 38 Bell, *op. cit.*, p.2.
- 39 Bell, *op. cit.*, p.4.
- 41 Alavi, *op. cit.*, p.70.
- 42 Alavi, *op. cit.*, pp. 74-75.
- 43 von Freyhold, *op. cit.*, p.78.
- 44 Langdon, *op. cit.*, p.96.

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